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Abstract: The growing presence of foreign workers has sparked a continuing debate in labour importing
COUntriesin East Asia on the socio-economic consequences of labour inflows and the policy options for
dealing with the 'foreign worker problem'. At the heart of this debate is the concern that heavy dependence
Onforeign workers could suppress domestic real wages with adverse implications for economic restructuring
and productivity growth. The purpose of this paper is to inform this debate through a case study of Malaysia,
a country where increased presence of temporary foreign workers have played a key role in manufacturing
growth over the past two decades. The first four sections of the paper provide an overview of Malaysian
labour market policy, structural change and labour absorption, and emerging patterns of foreign worker
?resence in the manufacturing sector. This is followed by an econometric analysis of the determinants of inter-
Industry patterns of foreign worker dependence and wage differentials using a new panel dataset. The analysis
fOcusseson the relative importance of foreign worker dependence in determining wage trends compared to
other influences relating to the structure and conduct of domestic manufacturing. It is of course not possible to
generalize from a single country case, but our results do call for a reconsideration of general perception that
foreign workers suppress wages.
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1Foreign Labour in Malaysian Manufacturing:
Trends, Patterns and Implications for Domestic Wages
1. INTRODUCTION
The growing presence of foreign workers has sparked a continuing debate in labour importing
COuntriesin East Asia on the social and economic consequences of labour inflows and the policy
Optionsfor dealing with the 'foreign worker problem'. A key concern of this debate is that influx of
cheap foreign labour suppresses domestic wage growth, with adverse implication for long-term
growth and improvement of economic welfare of native workers. In this view, availability of low-
wage immigrant labour forestalls skill upgrading and modernization of technology in the domestic
economy that might have occurred otherwise. Regulating labour inflows so that foreign workers are
made available only to supplement native workers and not to replace them has, therefore, become a
COntentiousissue in policy debates in labour importing countries (Ducanes and Abella 2008, Hugo
2004, Lee 2002).
Despite the prominence given to this issue in public policy debate, there is a dearth of
sYstematicempirical research on the impact of foreign worker presence on domestic wages in labour-
importing countries in East Asia. The debate is largely driven by a priori theorizing and casual
empiricism. There is of course a large empirical literature on the experiences of the traditional
imtnigration countries in the North.' However, it is hazardous to generalise from this literature
because labour market consequences of immigrants are likely to vary across countries depending on
the types of immigrants, local labour market conditions and the stage of development.
The paper aims to fill this knowledge gap through a case study of Malaysia. Malaysia is an
interesting 'laboratory' for an in-depth study of the issue at hand, given its heavy dependence on
foreign workers and the emphasis placed on the migration issue in the public policy debate.
~alaysia is the biggest net importer of labour in Asia with a migrant labour force of around 2 million
(21 percent of the total work force) as of 2008 (Ministry of Finance 2010). There is a growing
2concern in the Malaysian policy circles that wage suppression resulting from the heavy dependence
on migrant labour is a key factor that has locked the Malaysian economy in the 'the middle income
trap' (NEAC 2010, p.59). The reform initiatives under consideration for dealing with the 'foreign
worker problem' include enforcing equal labour standards for local and foreign workers, instituting
minimum wages' and revamping and streamlining of the present worker levy system (which has
been in place since 1992) to achieve specific limits on the entry of unskilled foreign labour in line
With national priorities of industrial upgrading/restructuring (NEAC 2010, Ministry of Finance
2010).
In this paper we focus specifically on the experience of Malaysian manufacturing because the
COntemporarydebate on the wage effect of migrant labour is specifically focussed on this sector.
Also data of reasonable quality required for the analysis are available only for this sector. The core
of the paper is an econometric analysis of the impact of foreign worker dependence on inter-industry
Wagedifferentials using a new panel data set, paying attention to possible simultaneity involved in
the relationship between the two variables. This is embodied in a survey of emerging patterns of
foreignworker presence in the manufacturing sector. We do find a statistically significant negative
impact of foreign worker presence on real wages, but the magnitude of the impact is rather small.
OUr results suggest that variables relating to the structure and performance of domestic
manufacturing are far more important than foreign worker dependence in explaining real wage
behaviour.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys Malaysia's labour market
POlicyand policies relating to migrant workers. Section 3 provides an overview of structural
Changesand labour market tightening that set the stage for the influx of migrant workers. Section 4
Provides an overview of the trends and characteristics of migrant worker presence for the ensuing
elllPiricalanalysis in the next section. Section 5, which forms the core of the paper, undertakes an
econometric analysis of the determinants of real wages in Malaysian manufacturing using a plant-
3level panel data set. It begins with a snapshot view of wage patterns, and then discusses model
formulation, variables construction and econometric methodology, followed by an interpretation of
econometric estimates, focussing on the relative importance of foreign worker dependence in
determining wage trends compared to other influences relating to the structure and conduct of
domestic manufacturing. The paper ends in Section 6 with some concluding remarks.
2. LABOUR MARKET POLICY
Malaysia has an industrial relation system carefully designed to avoid potential trade-off between the
rate of economic growth and the welfare of the work force. Over the years, government legislation
have hobbled trade unions and regulated collective bargaining. There are also no minimum wage
legislation or unemployment benefits. At the same time the government has developed and carefully
administered a comprehensive mechanism for protecting workers rights and providing them with
handsome social benefits and services in an overt fashion. From about late 1980s, Malaysia has
been in the midst of a debate on appropriate national policy towards migrant workers. Over the past
twodecades regulating the influx of foreign workers has been a key focus oflabour market policy.
Overall Policy Setting
A. striking feature of the Malaysian labour market scene throughout the post-independence era (since
1958)is the weakness of the trade union movement and its lack of political influence. In 1980, about
25 per cent of wage-earning workers were unionized, but by mid-1990s this figure had fallen to
about ]5 per cent. When workers in the plantation sector, the traditional power base of the union
illovement, are excluded the latter figure drops to a mere 6 per cent. By the mid-1990s, collective
agreements covered only around 120,000 workers (1.4 per cent of total employment in the country}'.
In 1965, as part of the 'confrontation emergency' (emergency declared following the
Indonesian confrontation began in 1963), the government promulgated regulations that allowed the
4Minister of Labour to refer industrial disputes to compulsory arbitration. Following the ending of the
confrontation in 1966, these emergency labour regulations were incorporated in a new Industrial
Relations Act in 1967. The Act also made it unlawful to use trade union funds for achieving political
objectives. Another provision of the Act required unions to be based on 'particular' or 'similar'
trades, occupations or industries', thus precluding the possibility of forming large general unions
cOveringworkers in different fields.
Attempts to restrict trade union activities received added emphasis as part of the new policy
orientation towards export-led industrialization (as part of the government's drive to attract foreign
capital in manufacturing). In 1974, when the global electronics companies started establishing
assembly plants in Malaysia, apparently the government reached an understanding with foreign
electronics companies not to allow unionization of workers. In 1976, when the Electrical Industry
Workers Union attempted to enroll workers employed in the electrical and electronics (E&E)
industry, the Registrar of Trade Unions ruled that the E&E industries were not similar and hence it
Was unlawful for electronics workers to join the union. Attempts by electronics workers to form a
Unionof their own under the umbrella of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) was
repeatedly rejected by the government until 1988 when the formation of in-house unions limited to
individual plant rather than a national union was permitted. In the textile and garment industry, the
government also prevented the formation of a national union combining state and regional unions.
The Industrial Relations Act was amended in 1977 to set the framework for maintaining
strong government control over the conduct of collective bargaining. Under this amendment, the
~inister of Labour was empowered to refer wage disputes to an Industrial Court if conciliators
appointed by the Industrial Relations Department of the Ministry were not able to achieve an
agreement among the parties involved. Once a dispute is referred to an Industrial Court, the workers
do not have the right to strike, that is, they must accept compulsory arbitration. Legislation enacted
In 1988 changed rules of collective bargaining, with a view to expediting dispute settlement and to
5minimizing the possible dominance of the interests of unions over those of workers in the bargaining
process.
Under the Wage Council Act of 1947, the Minister of Labour has the power to lay down
minimum wages (and other conditions of employment) through setting up of a National Wage
Council in trades or industries, with a view to providing protection for certain categories of workers"
in the absence of effective collective bargaining or other mechanisms to protect their rights.
Bowever, this legislation has hardly been used over the past four decades. By the mid-1990s, the
total number of workers covered by minimum wage legislation amounted to a little over 200,000 (2
per cent of total employment in the country) and in most cases minimum wages, being well below
actual (market determined) wages, had little impact on labour market behaviour.
Given government legislation that has continuously hobbled trade unions and collective
bargaining, by and large conditions of labour in Malaysia are determined unilaterally by employers
within the confines of the existing labour legislation. However, this does not mean that workers in
Malaysia have been marginalised in the process of distribution of gains from economic expansion.
Malaysia has a surprisingly good, orderly system of industrial relations for providing workers with a
wide range of social benefits and services which cover contingencies such as old age, employment
injury,occupational diseases, disability and invalidity.
There are two formal social security schemes currently in operation for employees in the
PriVatesector, namely the Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) and the Employees Social Security
SCheme(ESSS). The EPF, established in 1951 under the EPF Ordinance 1951 (subsequently
replaced by the EPF Act 1991), is the premier social security organisation in the country. It is a
Compulsorysaving schemes, which provides from the accumulation of saving by individual workers
(Private and non-pensionable workers) through a direct deduction from their monthly earnings
(currentlyequal to 11 percent) and a contribution from the employer (minimum of 12 per cent). Each
indiVidualemployee has a separate account, which is also credited with accrued interests. The
6employee may withdraw one-third of accumulated saving at the age of 50 and the entire balance on
retirement at age 55.
The EPF was originally set up as a scheme of old age protection. However, over the years, it
has expanded the range of benefits for its members to include a number of pre-retirement benefits.
These include paying an additional amount for death benefits over and above the EPF savings to the
next-of-kin of a deceased member (1977), allowing withdrawal of funds (up to 40 per cent) funds for
residential housing (1982), and paying incapability benefits to members over and above the EPF
(1986).
The ESSS, a compulsory social insurance scheme", was introduced in 1971 under the
Employees Social Security Act of 1969. All enterprises employing 5 or more employees are required
to register with the Social Security Organization (SOCSO). There are two schemes to cover the
COntingenciesof employment injury, occupational disease and invalidity or death: the Employment
Injury Insurance Scheme (EIS) (introduced in 1971) and the Invalid Pension Scheme (IPS)
(introduced in 1974). The EIS covers the contingencies of injury and death arising out of and in the
course of employment. Contribution for EIS is solely paid by the employer at the rate of 1.75 per
cent of the employee's monthly wage. In the case of IPS, the contribution is 1 per cent of montly
Wages,shared equally by the employer and employee. These are very generous: 80 per cent of the
Previous wage for temporary disability and 90 percent for permanent disability. All workers
employed under a contract of service and earning RM3,000 (revised from RM2,000 in 2007) or less
arecovered by these schemes.
This elaborate system of industrial relations and worker welfare provision has certainly
ensUredorderly labour relations and industrial peace. The average number of strikes per year
declinedfrom 35 in 1970s to 22 in 1980s and 15 in the 1990s. The average number of wage earners
inVolvedin strikes in a given year during these three decades never exceeded 0.2 per cent of the total
Workforce.Labour market flexibility has played a key role in facilitating growth through labour
7intensive manufactured exports with foreign capital participation. Given the high international
mObility of such production, growth of output and employment would have been severely
constrained had artificially high real wages or regulations driving up labour costs been enforced
through union pressure or government intervention.
POlicy on Migrant Workers
Malaysia's policy on the entry of semi-skilled and unskilled foreign workers has reflected a reaction to
Short-termneeds and labour shortages rather than an active and well thought out approach to meeting
long-term labour needs. Since the early 1980s, the government has made some attempts to prevent
illegal immigration and to regulate labour inflows. A chronology of key policy shifts is provided in
Table 1.
A key element of the regulatory mechanism is bilateral agreements signed with labour exporting
cOUntries,under which skill requirements and the sectors in which the workers are to be employed. By
selecting countries with which it signed agreements, Malaysia determines the nationality of migrant
workers. The first agreement (the Medan Agreement) was signed with Indonesia in 1984. Under this
agreement, Indonesia was to supply workers in six employment categories whenever requested by
Malaysia. A second agreement was signed in May 2004. Malaysia has also bilateral agreements with
thePhilippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. Private-sector employment agencies
arepermitted to recruit migrant workers from these countries.
There are basically two types of work permits. Unskilled and semiskilled workers (those
earning less than RM2,500 per month) are issued visit passes for temporary employment valid for a
Year,which can be renewed annually for a maximum of three years (increased to 5 years in 2001).
Bntry visas to professional workers are issued relatively liberally in all sectors and all occupations,
e)(ceptthose that have direct implications for national security. Professional workers/ expatriates are
iSSUedemployment passes with contracts of at least two years. In manufacturing, five expatriate
8posts are automatically allowed for new investments with paid-up capital ofUS$2 million and above,
and one key post if the paid-up capital is RM500,000. The employment of expatriates was further
encouraged by the government after the launching of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) under
the Seventh Malaysia Plan. Industries established within the MSC, launched in 1996, are permitted
to recruit an unlimited number of expatriates. More recently, the government employed skilled
eXpatriatesfrom China and India in the manufacturing sector (Ministry of Finance 2010).
An annual foreign worker levy, which varies by sector and skill category, was introduced in
1991. Currently, the annual levy is RM540 for the plantation sector, RM 900 for semi-skilled workers in
services sectors and RM2,400 for skilled workers. A mandatory contribution by employers to the
EPp on behalf of migrant workers was introduced in 1998. This was revoked in 200 I as employers
begun to switch to hiring illegal workers and under-reporting migrant wages to reduce EPF
COntribution.The government is currently considering a proposal to increase the levy by 400 per cent
by 2015 (The Star, 19 February 2011) and to introduce security bonds to ensure employers'
responsibility for adherence to employment contracts.
There have been periodic retrenchments and deportations of legal workers in times of
eConomicdownturns". For example, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in the 1997 led to temporary
movementto expel unskilled and undocumented foreign workers in August 1997. Soon after in July
199&, migrant inflows were encouraged to arrest the decline in foreign direct investment (FDI).
Illlilarly, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 once again reversed the preference towards
migrants, as policymakers froze their intake in manufacturing in January 2009 amidst the rising
IlUlllberof company closures and ensuing job layoffs. Within a period of six-months, the
government reopened the intake of migrant workers in the E&E and textile industries, following
~PPealsby key industry players on cancelled international sales orders due to labour shortfalls.
PUrther,the government had in some cases resorted to encourage the re-migration of illegals as an
Illllllediatemeasure to alleviate labour shortages. In October 2004, undocumented migrant workers
9who were deported under a four-month amnesty programme were thereafter allowed to return on
official permits.
To control illegal migrant inflows, several amnesty programmes have been launched since
1991. However, these attempts had only limited success, with the exception of the March-July 2002
programme that saw the departure of a total of 570,000 illegal workers. It appeared that shutting
legal channels for the recruitment of migrant workers were counter-productive as the inflows of
illegalworkers continued, largely abetted by corrupt practices of agents, immigration officials, police
and employers. The situation worsened when the government enacted a new outsourcing system in
2007, permitting licensed companies to recruit migrant workers. This not only created an
Outsourcing industry that flourished on rent-seeking behaviour, but in turn spawned a range of
abusive practices (NEAC 20 I0). Responding to this with a freeze on licenses issued to outsourcing
companies in 2009, the government has indeed begun to recognize that dilution of control by the
state in matters of in-migration is a sure recipe for disaster.
Although Malaysia labour law does not discriminate against foreign workers, there is
anecdotal evidence that, in practice, these workers rights are not fully protected. According to
estimates by the MTUC, approximately 15-20 per cent of registered foreign workers in the country
are being mistreated (ITUC 2010). Malpractices relating to foreign workers include non-payment of
wages, deduction of wages to cover the cost of work permits, long working hours, not providing
inSurancecoverage for workplace accidents, barriers to join unions, withholding travel documents,
and unfair dismissal. Recently the government made it mandatory for employers to provide migrant
Workerswith health insurance coverage (effective January 2011). This mandate, though it ostensibly
benefits foreign workers, was implemented mainly because of the high amount of unsettled public
hOSPitalbills by employers, totalling RMI8 million as at November 2010.
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3. GROWTH, STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND LABOUR MARKET TRANSITION
At the time of independence in 1957, the Malaysian economy showed less resemblance to a labour
surplus economy (Athukorala and Manning 1998, Chapter 6). Most Malay peasants operated small
family farms and faced difficulties in expanding into larger commercial units owing to labour
shortages. While there was evidence of under-utilised labour on a seasonal basis in food crop
production, returns to labour were high by regional standards and under-employment was not a
major factor contributing to low incomes and productivity. A growing informal sector already
existed in larger towns and cities, but there was little sign of chronic labour surplus.
Itwas only by about the late 1960s that Malaysia began to face a structural problem of excess
labour supply (Blake 1975, Snodgrass 1976). Both labour demand and supply factors were at play.
On the supply side, Malaysia, like several other countries in East Asia, began to experience a labour
force 'explosion' as a result of rapid population growth from around this time. Population growth
had accelerated to over 3 per cent per annum by the mid-1950s, after more than a decade of slow
expansion. Labour force growth followed suit, accelerating to over 3 per cent by the mid-1960s.
On the labour demand side, the plantation sector, which was the backbone of the economy at
the time, was predominantly based on indentured labour from China and India. It played a little role
In absorbing native Malays entering the labour force because they were unwilling to take socially
'inferior' wage work. Thus the country faced the dilemma of a large non-indigenous labour force
Workingalongside a swelling labour force of Malays. In non-plantation agriculture, there were
major constraints to finding enough new jobs. The smallholder rubber industry was no longer
eXpanding,and increases in productivity could only be supported through labour-displacing technical
Change. Structural change in estate agriculture was underway, but largely through extension of the
mOrecapital-intensive oil palm industry. There were also signs of surplus 'under-utilised' labour in
rice agriculture, as this industry expanded slowly and only with considerable government support.
Thus whereas a significant share of employment had been absorbed in agriculture (mainly into
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rUbber)through to the early 1960s, this sector's share of jobs fell steeply to around only 20 per cent
from 1962-67 (Snodgrass 1975). Though growth in the number of unemployed was high - in
absolute terms - it was only slightly smaller than the (net) number of people who found new jobs in
agriculture in the same period. Moreover, the spread of primary and increasingly secondary
edUcation to young rural women, in particular, had also begun to fuel search for urban wage
employment on a scale never experienced in the past. Thus, increasing numbers of rural Malays
Wereseeking work in cities such as Kuala Lumpur, in response to shortages of jobs (or an aversion to
less preferred jobs in agriculture) in their home villages
The industries set up under tariff protection in the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by a
,
natural' capital intensity in line with the general experience with import-substitution
indUstrialization in developing countries. Thus, manufacturing absorbed a small proportion (13 per
cent by the late 1960s) of the work force and the main burden of non-agricultural jobs had to be
shouldered by the services industry whose expansion had been naturally constrained by limited real-
sector growth. As a result, recorded unemployment rates rose to around 8 per cent by 1970 with
Urbanunemployment hovering around 10 percent (Snodgrass 1980, p.59). After a drop to around 5
Percent in the early 1980s reflecting the impact of short-lived state-led industrial expansion, the
unemployment rate continued to increase reaching a peak of 8.3 percent in 1986.
From the late 1980s, export-oriented manufacturing turned out to be the engine of growth in
the Malaysian economy (Figures 1 and 2). Between 1987 and 1997, the manufacturing sector grew
by an average annual rate of 14 percent, almost double the rate of expansion achieved in the previous
ten Years. In 1989, for the first time the manufacturing share in GDP overtook that of agriculture.
The share of manufacturing in GDP increased from about 20 per cent to nearly 30 per cent during
this period, contributing to over 50 per cent of the total increment in GDP. In addition, much of
OUtputexpansion in the tertiary (service) sectors was closely related to the expansion of the
manufacturing sector. Consequently, there was an increasingly close relationship between
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manufacturing growth and GDP growth during this period (Figure 2). The share of manufacturing in
total labour deployment in the economy increased from 15 per cent in the mid-1980s to 27 per cent
in 1997, contributing to nearly two-thirds of the total increment in employment during the period.
The manufacturing sector's share in GDP has shown a mild decline during the period after the APC,
but its share in total employment has continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate compared to the
previous decade (Figure 1).
The rapid expansion of export-oriented manufacturing, particularly the E&E industries, was
accompanied by persistent decline in the unemployment rate. By the mid 1990s the Malaysian
economy was at virtual full-employment, with an unemployment rate of only 2.8 per cent. With the
approach of full employment with intensification of pressure on domestic wages, Malaysia has begun
to attack migrant workers in large numbers from neighbouring labour surplus countries, Indonesia in
particular.
4. FOREIGN WORKERS IN MALAYSIAN MANUFACTURING
The number of registered foreign workers increased from around 440 thousand (3.2 per cent of the
labour force) in 1990 to over 2 million (21 per cent of the labour force) in 2008, accounting for over
a third ofthe increase in total labour supply in the economy between these two years (Table 2). From
about the late 1990s, Malaysia has been the largest labour importer in Asia, both in terms of the
absolute number of foreign workers and their share in the domestic labour force (Athukorala 2006,
Ducaneand Abella 2008).8
Until about the mid-1980s, foreign workers in Malaysia were engaged predominantly in the
agricultural sector (mainly in plantation agriculture), which faced severe labour shortages as native
workersmoved to take up employment opportunities in the booming modem sector. Since then, they
haVegradually penetrated the modem sector of the economy, first to the construction industry and
SUbsequently modem sector servrces, household services and manufacturing. The share of
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documented foreign workers in manufacturing increased from less than 10 per cent in the early
1990s to 36 per cent in 2007, by far the largest share among the major economic sectors in the
Malaysian economy (Table 2).9
Foreign workers in Malaysia are predominantly from the neighbouring Indonesia. However,
OVerthe years the recruitment network has expanded to other countries in the region and beyond
(Bangladesh, Philippines, Nepal, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Timor
Leste, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) (Ramasamy 2004).10 In general, the
diversification of source-country composition of labour supply reflects the government's attempt to
Control the source of inflows on socio-cultural grounds, rather than supply-side factors, in
determining labour inflows. Interestingly, the industry/sectoral composition of workers is quite
segmented by country of origin: Indonesian workers are heavily concentrated in construction and
agriculture; Bangladeshis are predominantly in manufacturing; Filipinos are mainly employed as
higher status maids, alongside lower paid Indonesians meeting demand in a different segment of the
market; and Vietnamese are mainly in the construction sector.
The number of registered foreign workers employed in Malaysian manufacturing increased
from about 8,000 (1.6 per cent of the manufacturing labour force) to over 200,000 (14.5 per cent) by
1995. II Following a mild decline during the years of the AFe, the number increased sharply during
the ensuing years, 360,000 mark by 2005 (Figure 3). Foreign workers in Malaysian manufacturing
are unevenly distributed across industries (Table 3). They are heavily concentrated in export-
:lriented industries compared to domestic-market oriented industries. During 2000-05, export-
:lriented industries (defined to cover industries with export-output ratios of more than 50 per cent)
iCCOUntedfor over two-thirds of total foreign workers engaged in Malaysian manufacturing (Table
~). Among export-oriented industries, the degree of dependence on foreign workers is much higher
'elative to the overall manufacturing average only in the traditional labour-intensive export-oriented
ndUstries (wood products, rubber goods, textiles and garments and miscellaneous manufacturing),
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and also the E&E industry, which is conventionally classified as a capital intensive/high-tech
industry. It seems that the types of jobs taken up by foreign workers (3-D jobs) are not necessarily
industry-specific. Even though it is generally believed that jobs in the high-tech industries are clean
and highly paid, there are many jobs in these industries that involve long working hours and hard
labour and hence shunned by native workers.
Foreign workers are predominantly engaged in low-skill (unskilled and semi-skilled) jobs
(Table 4). Over 80 per cent of foreign workers are engaged in low-skill jobs compared to less than
half of the native workers. The share of skilled workers among foreign workers has declined across
al] industries. Nearly 78 per cent of all foreign workers in manufacturing in 1990 were production
Workers/operatives. This figure then increased to 95 per cent in 2005. The share of foreign
production workers in total production workers had similarly increased from 3.5 per cent to 30.3 per
cent over the period of review. Interestingly, the low-skilled share in total foreign workers is
Unfirmlyhigh (over 90 per cent) across all industries (with the exception of petroleum and chemical
industries) (Table 3). These patterns reaffirm our earlier observation that migrant worker
Concentrationin unskilled jobs is not industry specific, but a common phenomenon.
An important feature of the process of export-oriented industrialisation in Malaysia is its
heavyconcurrent reliance on both foreign workers and foreign capital (involvement of multinational
enterprises (MNEs). As already noted, export-oriented industries are generally more reliant on
foreignworkers compared to domestic-market oriented industries. The degree of MNE participation
(
,as llleasured by the MNE share in output) is also much higher in these industries. In particular,
MNt dominated E&E industry, by far the major export-oriented industry in the country, accounted
rorOnefifth of total foreign workers in manufacturing. Why both foreign labour and foreign capital
mOVeto Malaysia? Why MNEs do not relocate manufacturing in labour abundant neighbouring
~OUntriesinstead of relying on foreign labour for undertaking production in Malaysia? The answer
leellls to be that availability of cheap labour, while important, is secondary to the quality of the
15
overall investment environment in determining a country's attractiveness for FDI. Since the early
1970s, Malaysia's investment climate has remained highly favourable for international production
compared to that in all source countries of foreign workers employed in Malaysia.
5. FOREIGN WORKERS AND DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING WAGES
Figure 4 depicts the time patterns of average real wages and foreign worker presence in
manufacturing, focussing separately on total workers and low-skill (production) workers. The data
are generally consistent with the popular perception that the increased presence of foreign workers
has been associated with a slowing down of real wage growth. Real wage of both all manufacturing
workers and unskilled workers increased at an annual average rate of 4 per cent during 1992-1999.
During 2000-05, when there was a significant continuous increase in the degree of dependence on
foreign workers, average total manufacturing wage grew by only 1.95 per cent and the rate of
increase in average low-skill wage rate was even lower, 0.92 per cent. The patterns revealed by the
Scatter plot of real annual wages and shares of foreign workers in total employment of five-digit over
the period 2000-2005 (Figure 5) are consistent with those revealed in the time-series comparison.
The Pearson rank correlation coefficients between real wages and foreign worker dependency, -0.402
and -0.322 for total workers and unskilled (production) workers respectively, are both statistically
siO"hifsru tcant at the one per cent level.
Thus the first impression from a casual inspection of data is consistent with the widely-held
view that foreign worker presence suppress domestic manufacturing wage. But, it is hazardous to
read too much meaning into this simple correlation because there are many other factors which
impact on inter-industry differentials in wages and wage growth over time at the industry level. Now
WetUrn to a regression analysis that deals with this relationship in greater detail. We first focus on
1J.odel formulation, followed by a brief discussion on the data and the estimation methods before
)rese t'n mg the results.
The Model
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We examine the postulated wage restraining effect of foreign worker presence in manufacturing by
estimating the following model.
RWG = F (FWDit, RQit, xi; SKLit, SIZEit, FO~t, eo; CNCit, DTUN)
(+ or -) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (-) (+ or -) (-)
Wherei = 1, 2, ..., n is the industry, t = 1, 2, ... , T is the time unit in years, RWG is real wage and
FWD is the share of foreign workers in total employment (foreign-worker dependence). The control
variables are,
RQ
«i
SlQ
SIZE
POW
cO
CNC
Real output (value added)
Capital intensity
Skill intensity
Average firm size
Foreign ownership
Export orientation
Industry concentration (four-firm concentration ratio)
1)TUN 'Trade union' dummy, to capture restriction on trade union activity
RQ, KL and SIZE are measured in natural logarithms, whereas SKL, FOW, CNC and EO are
)ercentage shares.
The main variable of interest is foreign worker dependence, FWD, which is postulated to
lavea negative effect on domestic wages. Among the control variables, real output (RQ) is included
o Capture the impact of labour demand associated with output growth on wages. If the labour
narkets are generally competitive and if each industry faces a roughly similar less than perfectly
:lasticlabour supply curve, then industries wishing to expand output would have to pay higher than
verage wages.
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The choice of capital intensity (KL) and establishment size (SIZE) as explanatory variables is
Suggested by the efficiency wage literature (Brown and Medoff 1989, Murphy and Topel 1990). All
other things constant, one can postulate that higher capital intensity encourages firms to pay efficient
wages, since it is more costly for capital intensive firms to suffer employee shirking or absenteeism.
Apart from this efficiency consideration, one can also expect firms in capital intensive industries to
concede to higher wage increases because their wage bills would typically account for a relatively
Sl11allproportion of production cost. Put simply, firms in capital-intensive product lines may not be
So cost conscious with respect to wages. By similar reasoning, large firms may pay higher wages
than smaller firms, presumably because shirking is harder to monitor in larger firms. The tendency
for shirking might be greater in large firms because employees' discontent with the job is likely to
correlate positively with the firm size. In addition to KL, skill intensity (SKL) is included as an
explanatory variable to allow for the possibility that industries with a higher proportion of skilled
Workers in total employment tend to exhibit higher average wages.
Foreign ownership (FOW) is included guided by the literature on wage setting behaviour of
MNE affiliates in host countries.i'' An empirically-supported consensus view in this literature is that
that MNE affiliates have a tendency to pay higher wages than their domestically-owned counterparts.
SUchdifference may reflect MNEs' willingness to pay wages that are more in line with what they
Pay in their home countries, and/or simply their desire to maintain an image of good corporate
~itizens in the host country.
Export-oriented firms generally operate under greater demand pressure compared to
:lOl11estic-market oriented firms which enjoy both policy-induced and natural protection. This may
:>eparticularly true for exporting firms in a small exporting economy like Malaysia, given the nature
)f the export mix (which is dominated by standardised labour intensive consumer goods and
~Ol11ponentassembly in vertically integrated industries) and the small share in world supply in most
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(if not all) of product lines. For these reasons, EO is included as an additional explanatory variable in
the regression.
Among the other explanatory variables, industry concentration (CNC) is included to capture
the impact of market power of a given industry on wage growth. The hypothesis is that since greater
market power translates into excess profits, firms in monopolistic or oligopolistic industries insulate
from market pressure and therefore pursue a policy of paying highly competitive wages.
Alternatively, greater market power may translate into greater bargaining power of employers to keep wages
down.
A binary 'trade union dummy' (DTUN) (1 for industries which come under the standard
industry classification of electronics products and parts) is included to capture the impact on inter-
industry wage differentials of the prevailing restrictions trade union activity. As parts of an
understanding reached in the early 1970s with foreign electronics companies which set up production
In the country, the Malaysian government has continued to strictly prohibit workers in these
indUstriesbecoming members of national trade unions. They are permitted to join only in-house-
Unionsl3 limited to individual firms (Crouch 1996, pp.224-25). It is generally believed that this
restriction on trade union activity has constrained wage bargaining power of electronics workers
(I<.oshi2010). Ideally, we should have included a direct indicator of trade union influence such as
the rate of unionization (union membership in total work force) or the number of days lost due to
tradeunion action, encompassing all industries, but unfortunately data are not available.
Data and Variable Construction
Data on manufacturing wages, employment, output, capital and exports were compiled from the
~Iectronicdata files containing unpublished returns to the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries
:AS~'lI) conducted by the Department of Statistics (DOS), Malaysia. Price indices used for deflating
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CUrrent-price output and wage series were from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin database of the Bank
Negara Malaysia.
The ASMI data are available electronically from 1992, but it is not possible to consistently
match the data after 1999 with those for the preceding years at the four- or five-digit level of the
standard industry classification because of a major change in the classification system introduced
with effect from 2000. Moreover, the data file for the years prior to the introduction of the new
revision do not contain data required for the construction of three variables relevant for our analysis
(POW, EO and CNC). For these reasons, we opted to focus primarily on a data panel constructed at
the five-digit level covering the six-year period from 2000 to 2005 (the latest year for which data
were available at the time of data compilation). However as a rough check on the estimates coming
from these data, we also report estimates for the truncated model (that is after deleting FOW, EO and
CNC from the full model) for the period 1992-2005 using a panel data set constructed at the 3-digit
levels. Both data panels are balanced.l"
The DOS database provides employment and wage data under five major occupational
~ategories: managerial and professional, technical and supervisory, clerical and related workers,
~eneral workers, and production workers and operatives (directly employed and through labour
:ontractors). For the purpose of this study, production workers and operatives (workers who earn
ess than RM2,500 per month) are defined as unskilled workers whilst the professional and
Uanagerial workers are treated as skilled technocrats (with earnings of more than RM2,500 per
UOnth).15Unskilled foreign workers refer to workers who hold temporary work permits which are
'eneWedannually, although the employment agreements are normally for three years. The wage bill
ncludes both regular wage/salary and all other payments in cash to workers, other than the
:mpioYer's contribution to provident funds. The definition and measurement of variables used in
egression analysis are summarised in Table 5.
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Estimation Method
We first estimated the model using fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) estimators and
compared the results using Wu-Hausman test. The test decisively rejected the null hypothesis that
Unobservedexplanatory variables (the unobserved effects) are not distributed independently of the
explanatory variables, favouring the use of the FE estimator. However, an obvious limitation of the
FE estimator is that it cannot retain DTUN (which is time-invariant) in the estimated model.
Omission of DTUN is unlikely to impact on the coefficient estimates of the other variables, because
it is essentially industry specific, but this variable is important for our analysis in its own right. We
therefore report results based on both FE and RE estimators, while giving preference to the results
basedon the former. 16
The simple FE and RE estimators can yield bias and inconsistent coefficient estimates if one
:lrmore explanatory variables are endogenous (that is, if they are jointly determined together with
:hedependent variable). In our case, there are reasons to suspect that FWD in the wage equation is
)otentially endogenous for a number of reasons. For instance, foreign workers may tend to
:oncentrate in industries where positive demand shocks have led to better labour market conditions
Indhigher wages for both immigrants and native workers. In this case, immigrant inflows are not
Inlydriven by labour market changes but labour market changes, in tum, are driven by migrant
nflows. The government usually takes into account labour market conditions (including wage
rends) faced by individual industries in regulating labour inflows. Moreover, unobserved factors
ffectingmigrant flows (industry lobbying) are likely to simultaneously affect wages. Compared to
he RE estimator, the FE estimator has the advantage that it controls for industry-specific fixed
aCtorsaffecting both these variables. However, the FE estimator would not help addressing the
ndogeneity problem ifthere are time-varying omitted variables affecting the dependent variable and
orrelatedwith the foreign worker dependency variable.
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Given this concern, we re-estimated the model by combining FE and RE estimators each with
the instrumental variable (IV) estimator. The instrument used is the lagged foreign worker
dependency (FWDt_I). The rationale behind this instrumental variable choice is that variation in past
tnigration affects current-year migration but should have no direct effect on current year wages. It
captures persistence in migration. Persistence is indeed a well-known feature in the migratory
process; past migration leads to future migration through network effect (Hanson 2010) and also as
firms become accustomed to relying on foreign workers (Borjas 1999). Admittedly, this instrument
is not perfect: past migration rate could well be correlated with future wages anticipated by firms.
Bowever, we fail to detect significant correlation between our instrument and the error term of our
secondstage regression.
Results
l'he final FE and RE instrumental variable (IV) estimates of the model for the period 2000-05 are
reported in Table 6.17 Panel unit root tests, summary statistics of the variables and their correlation
tnatrix are reported in Tables 7, 8 and 9 respectively to facilitate interpretation of the results. The
alternative simple FE and RE estimates are reported in Appendix Table A-I for comparison.
As already noted, in interpreting the estimates our prime focus is on the FE estimates. The
cOefficientof foreign-worker dependence variable (FWD) has the negative sign in both total wage
eqUation(Equation 1) and unskilled-worker wage equation (Equation 3). It is however statistically
insignificant in the former, but highly significant in the latter. Overall, the results are consistent with
thegeneral perception that the presence of foreign workers suppresses real wages, but the magnitude
Ofthe wage suppression effect seems rather small. In relation to unskilled-worker wages for with the
relationship is more precisely estimated, the result suggests only a 1.9 per cent decline in real wages
fOra 10 per cent increase in the degree of foreign worker dependency. 18 In both cases, the FE and RE
estirnatesof the coefficient of foreign worker dependence variable overlap within the two-standard
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error band, but the difference in magnitude between the two estimates is not large, suggesting that
Ourinference is not sensitive to the choice of estimation method.
One could reasonably question whether the estimated coefficient of FWD is affected by
multicollinearity: in particular, it is possible that FWD is (negatively) correlated with capital
Intensity given the tendency for foreign workers to concentrate in labour intensive industries. But,
the estimated correlation coefficient between FWD and KL is only -0.28 for all workers and -0.22 for
unskilled workers (Table 8).19 FWD is also only weakly correlated with all other explanatory
variables in both cases. To be sure, we also estimated the equation after omitting KL and found the
coefficient of FWD is robust to this alternative specification.i''
Among the control variables, the coefficients of RQ, KL, SKL, SIZE are highly significant (at
1percent level or 5 per cent level) with expected signs in both total workers and unskilled worker
eqUations, and the results are remarkably robust to the method of estimation. The estimated degree of
!Iasticity of real wage with respect to each of these variables is much larger compared to that with
'espect to FWD. Thus there is strong statistical support for the proposition that factors closely related
:0 manufacturing performance and industrial structure are much more important compared to foreign
~orker dependence in explaining real wage behavior.
The coefficient of EO bears the expected (negative) sign but is not statistically significant in
lOth FE-IV equations, providing no statistical support for the hypothesis that greater export
lrientation is associated with lower wages. At the same time, there is only weak statistical support
r the hypothesis that foreign firms tend to pay higher wages compared to their local counterparts.
fhe coefficient of FOW has the expected sign in both FE-IV regressions but is statistically
,ignificant (at 10 per cent level) only in the wage equation for all workers. The result for this
'ariable is also highly sensitive to the choice between instrumented FE and RE estimators. The
esults for the impact of industrial concentration on real wages are also mixed.
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The coefficient of DTUN in both RE-IV equations (Equations 2 and 4) 21 is significant at the
5 per cent level with the expected (negative) sign. The estimates suggest that workers in industries
where national trade unions are prohibited on average earn 11.3 per cent less than their counterparts
in other industries.v' The impact is even larger for unskilled worker wages, 21.7 per cent. These
results, although they are very much in line with the generally expected impact of trade union
Pressure on wage setting, need to be treated with caution because the Malaysian policy of national
Union membership prohibition is applicable solely to the electronics industry. The estimates
Presumably capture not only the impact of labor law but also some structural peculators of this
Industry, to the extent the latter are not appropriately captured in the other control variables in the
illOdel. This is certainly an important issue which deserves further scrutiny.
Finally, we turn to the estimates based on the truncated model (that is after dropping FOW,
£0 and CNC) estimated using three-digit data over the period 1992-2005 (Table 10). Estimates are
reported for the entire period as well as for two sub-periods, 1992-99 and 2000-05 to facilitate
COmparison. The coefficient of FWD in the alternative estimate for period 2000-2005 is remarkably
sillliIar to our earlier result from the full model estimated using five-digit level data. Both
tOefficients suggest a highly significant negative effect of foreign worker dependence on real wages,
qOdthey overlap within a two standard error band. However, the coefficient estimate for the full
Ileriod suggests a highly significant complementary (positive) relationship between foreign worker
dependence and real wages for all workers. The estimates for the two sub-periods indicate that this
cOlllplementary relationship for the overall period is the net outcome of a strong positive effect in the
fIrstsub period that overwhelmed the negative effect in the latter period. During 1992-99, a 10 per
tent increase in foreign worker dependency was associated with 0.8 per cent increase in wages of all
~anUfacturing workers and 0.4 per cent increase in wages of unskilled workers. These estimates are
tenerally consistent with the prevailing view in Malaysian policy circles that foreign workers, who
~eremostly complementary to local employment to begin with, have begun to compete with local
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workers with th f . d . lb·e passage 0 time, as omestic a our market tightened and the presence of migrant
~~~b ' .ecause a permanent' feature of the economic landscape of the country. However, the
est"Imates need to be treated cautiously because of the possible aggregation bias involved in the use
of data at the three-digit level. In any case, from policy point of view, what is more important is the
magnitude of the estimated relationship, which is rather small compared to the estimated impact of
industry structure and performance variables.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
W·ith the rapid growth of labour inflows from less-developed to rapidly-growing countries within the
developing world, whether increased presence of foreign workers constrains domestic wage growth
w·Ith adverse implications for growth and structural transformation in the domestic economy has
become a major concern in economic policy debate in the latter countries. In this paper, we have
attempted to inform this debate through a case study of Malaysia, which has emerged over the past
one-and-a_half decades as the major host to foreign workers in Asia.
We do find a statistically significant negative impact of foreign worker dependency on real
manufacturing wages, but the magnitude of the impact is small. Real manufacturing wages seem
fundamentally embedded in the structure and performance of domestic manufacturing, with the
influx f . 0 1 . . .o foreign workers having an impact only at the margm. ur resu ts caution against putting
the blame for slow wage growth mainly (in not solely) on foreign workers, as has been done, for
eXample, in an influential policy report (NEAC 2010), without probing the issue in the wider context
of the industrialization process, the underlying policy framework and the resultant incentive
structure. The long standing labour market regime that has cushioned specific industnes against
Wagebargaining within the national trade unions may also have played a role.
In this paper we have solely examined the impact of foreign workers presence on
manUfacturing wages treating the contemporary policy concern that foreign workers thwarts capital
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Appendix
Table A-1: Determinates oflnter-Industry Wage Differences: FE and RE Estimates
2000-20051 '
(Dependent variable: log of real average annual wage, RWG)
All Workers Unskilled Workers
FE RE
FE RE
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
Constant term
6.689*** 6.703***
6.249*** 6.488***
(0.507) (0.225)
(0.770) (0.288)
Foreign worker dependence (FWD)
-0.001 -0.003***
-0.002** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
(0.001) (0.001)
Real output (RQ)
0.045** 0.035*"'*
0.061 * 0.043*"'*
(0.023) (0.010)
(0.032) (0.012)
Capital intensity (KL)
0.129*** 0.145*"'*
0.115*** 0.122***
(0.030) (0.019)
(0.039) (0.024)
Skill intensity (SKL)
0.008 0.014***
-0.006 0.002
-
0.005 (0.004)
(0.006) (0.004)
Average firm size (SIZE)
0.019 0.031**
0.042 0.039**
(0.032) (0.015)
(0.035) (0.018)
Foreign ownership (FOW)
0.002** 0.001....
0.002* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)
(0.001) (0.001)
-
Export orientation (EO)
0.000 -0.001
-0.0003 -0.001 *
(0.001) 0.001
(0.001) (0.0005)
Industry concentration (CNC)
_0.0004 0.001
-0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
(0.002) (0.001)
Trade union dummy (DTUN)
-0.095* -0.203***
(0.056) (0.078)
Time dummies
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
F-statistics
19.96
4.98
Wald X2
483.57 203.27
RZ
0.531 0.634
0.217 0.395
No. of observations
1020 1020
1020 1020
No. of groups
170 170
170 170
Breusch-Pagan LM tes?
x2 (I) - 1301.73 "'/.2 (1) 1242.02
Wu-Hausman test
Z
X2 (12) 215.83
X2(12)·- 90.92
Notes: d d
adiusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation are gi . b
1. Stan ar errors" d d *** 1% ** 5% and * 10% ven In rackets,
with statistical significance enote as 0, 0 o.
2. Null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level
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Table 1: Chronology of Policies Related to Migrant Workers, 1980-2010
Year Policy/ Regulation
1982 Formation of Committee for the Recruitment of Foreign Workers.
1984 Medan Agreement with Indonesia - for agri-plantation and domestic workers.
1985-86 Signing of the MoO between Malaysia and the Philippines - for domestic workers;
Permission given for employers to recruit workers from Bangladesh and Thailand for the
plantation and construction sectors.
1987 Legalized the use of Indonesian workers in the plantation sector.
1989 Regularization programme.
Jan-90 Freeze on labor importation from Indonesia.
1991 Formation of Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers.
Oct-91 Introduction of an annual migrant-worker levy, which varies by sector and skill category
(general, semi skilled and unskilled). Agriculture (RM360, RM540 and RM720);
Construction (RM420, RM600 and RM900); Manufacturing (RM420, RM600 and
RM900); Services (RM360, RM540 and RM720).
Dec-91 Launching of Ops Nyah I (Operation Expunge I - to stop illegal infiltration).
Jun-92 Launching ofOps Nyah II (Operation Expunge II - to weed out illegal immigrants).
Jul-92 Permission given for employers to recruit workers from Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines,
Bangladesh and Pakistan for manufacturing and services sectors.
Apr-93 -Jan-94 Ban on unskilled worker recruitment. Ban lifted for manufacturing sector. Ban re-
implemented on unskilled and semi-skilled workers for all sectors.
Oct-95 Special Task Force on Foreign Labor (the sole agency for recruitment - a one-stop-agency
to deal with the processing of immigrants).
Dec-95 All levies increased by 100% except for agriculture and domestic service. Itwas raised to
RM1200 for construction and manufacturing and RM720 for services.
Jan-96 Freeze on the importation of skilled and unskilled labor except for critical sectors in
manufacturing and recreation! tourist industries.
Apr-96 Hari Raya Amnesty for Indonesian illegal workers.
Aug-96 - Jan-97 Freeze on labor importation (employers were instructed to recruit directly from the
immigration detention depots) - eventually cancelled the exercise due to the lukewarm
response from employers.
Mac-97 Task Force disbanded - functions taken over by the Foreign Workers Division of the
Immigration Department.
Aug-97 Ban on new recruitment on migrant workers due to the AFC. Second regularization
exercise for illegal migrants from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh and
Pakistan.
Jan-98 Annual levy per worker raised to RMI500 for the construction, manufacturing and
services sector. Itwas maintained at RM360 for the plantation and domestic services
sector. Mandatory contribution to EPF (12% and 11% of monthly wages by employers
and employees respectively).
Jul-98 Ban on the renewal of work permits for the services sector lifted.
Oct-98 Ban on new recruitment lifted - 120,000 new work permits approved for migrant workers
i
in plantation and construction sectors.
Nov-Dec-98 Freeze on the importation of migrant workers lifted.
Feb-99 Levies are lowered for all categories (from RMI500 to RMI200), except domestic
workers. New hirings of mostly Indonesian workers.
Oct-99 Recruitment of Sri Lankans in the manufacturing sector.
2001 Mandatory contribution to EPF revoked.
May-Ol Ban on intake of Bangladeshis - following clashes with locals.
Oct-OI Maximum limit of temporary work_E_asslimited from 5 years to 3 years.
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Table 1contd.
Year Policy/ Regulation
Feb-02 Maximum work permit extended to a 3+1+ 1 ruling (except for domestic services). Ban
on new recruitment of Indonesian workers in all sectors, except for domestic services.
Mac-Jul-02 Amnesty programme.
Jul-02 Recruitment of Cambodians in the agri-plantation, manufacturing and construction
sectors.
Jan-03 Restrictions lifted on Indonesian workers in the manufacturing and construction sectors.
Apr-03 Freeze on hiring of migrant workers from SARs related countries.
Sept-03 Signing of MoU between Malaysia and China - for workers in ceramics and furniture.
Amendment to Immigration Act 2002 - higher penalty for illegal immigration.
Oct-03 Mandatory whipping of up to six strokes of the cane for irregular migrants and their
employers.
Dec-03 Signing of the MoU between Malaysia and Vietnam.
Mac-04 New requirement - migrant workers to attend classes on Malaysian language and culture.
Oct-04 Illegal workers allowed to return on official permits.
2005 Permission granted to migrant workers whose contracts have expired to change
employers within the same economic sector as long as their work permits are still valid.
Mac-05 Signing of the MoU between Malaysia and Pakistan.
Aug-05 (i) RELA, or the People's Volunteer Corps given power to arrest unauthorized migrants
until mid-2009 - provided opportunities for extortion.
(ii) Levies are revised: RM1200 (RM960) for manufacturing and construction in
Peninsular (East Malaysia); RM540 for plantations; and RMl800 (RM1440) for non-
domestic services in Peninsular (East Malaysia).
2006 (i) Ministry of Home Affairs licensed 270 outsourcing companies to recruit mainly South
Asian migrants.
(ii) Electronic Labour Exchange (ELX) created at the MOHR - mandatory for employers
in plantation, construction, manufacturing and services to advertise vacancies in the ELX
before they can apply to bring in migrant workers.
Nov-06 Signing of the MoU between Malaysia and Indonesia - Malaysian employers are asked
to pay RM2,415 to a local agent while the domestic worker has to pay her Indonesia-
based agent RMI,228.
2007 New outsourcing system that does not attach workers permits to a particular employer-
dilutes the control of the government.
Jul-07 Major operation to round up an estimated 500,000 irregular migrants.
Oct-07 Ban on the recruitment of Bangladeshi workers because of problems arising from agents
(both recruiting agencies in their home country and outsourcing companies in Malaysia).
Jan-08 Unskilled migrant workers will not have their work permits extended if they have been
in the country for five years or more.
2009 Freeze on the issuance of new licenses for labour outsourcing companies.
Jan-09 Freeze on labour importation to the manufacturing sector.
Apr-09 Cost of levy to be borne by employers, instead of workers.
Oct-09 Protests by migrant workers that employers continued deducting wages to cover the levy
I
charges.
Jul-09 Freeze on the importation of migrant workers lifted for specific industries.
Nov-IO Compulsory medical insurance policy for migrant workers (excluding domestic maids)
effective Jan 2011 - annual premium of RM120 per worker.
Sources: Chin (2002), Kanapathy (2004) and updated using official publications and press releases.
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Table 2: Malaysia: Distribution of Foreign Workers by Key Sectors (in %)
-- Sector 1985 1990 2000 2005 2008--Agriculture 50.1 37.7 24.8 26.0 25.0--Manufacturing 6.9 8.8 38.1 32.1 36.0r-
Construction 15.0 34.4 8.5 15.5 14.0
I--
Non-Domestic Services 20.3' 19.1 6.7 8.8 9.0r-
Domestic Services --- --- 22.0 17.6 16.0
TOTAL % 95.3 99.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number '000 212 440 807 1815 2020..__
..Notes: 1 Includes forestry, fishing and rmrung 2 Includes domestic services --- Not available
Source: Athukorala and Manning (1999), Athukorala (2006) and Jones (2011) (based on unpublished official sources).
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Table 4: Occupational Composition of Foreign Workers in Malaysian Manufacturing
(in %)
Occupational Category 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Professional & Managerial 18.2 15.7- 3.4 2.3 1.5
Technical & Supervisory 3.6 3.0 1.2 1.3 1.2
Clerical& Related Occupations 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.5
General Workers 3.7 2.8 0.9 1.5 2.3
Unskilled (Production) Workers 73.1 77.8 94.4 94.8 94.8.._
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
Number 7517 16377 141930 217262 363029
Note: Based on the International Labour Organisation (ILO) occupational classification.
Source: Compiled from unpublished returns to the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries conduc
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
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Table 5: Definition and Measurement of Variables
Variable Measurement
RWG Real wage Average annual earnings per full-time worker
(wage/salary plus other payments in cash
excluding employer's contribution to provident
funds) deflated by the consumer price index.
FWD Foreign worker dependency Share of foreign workers in total full-time
employment
RQ Real output (value added) Nominal value-added (gross output at ex-factory
price - cost of intermediate inputs) deflated by
producer price index (available only at the two-
digit level). The same two-digit price index is
used for the five-digit industries tailing under
..._ that category .
KL Capital intensity Real fixed assets (nominal fixed assets deflated
by the implicit deflator for gross fixed capital
formation) divided by full-time employees.
SKL Skill intensity Share of professional and managerial workers in
total full-time employment
J.IZE Average firm size Number of employees per firm
FOW Foreign ownership The share of foreign firms (affiliates of MNEs)
defined as firms with 50 per cent or more foreign
r-.. equity ownership to total gross output
~O Export orientation The share of exports in gross output.
CNC Industry concentration The share of the four largest plants in total gross
I"- output in a given industry
DrUN Trade union dummy 1 for industries in which national trade union
membership is prohibited (electronics products
I"- and components) and zero for other industries
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Table 6: Determinates of Inter-Industry Wage Differences: FE-IV and RE-IV Estimates,
2000-2005
(Dependent variable: log of real annual average wage, RWG)
All Workers Unskilled Workers
FE RE FE RE
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant term 6.647*** 6.786*** 6.167*** 6.727***
(0.234) (0.164) (0.327) (0.202)
Foreign worker dependence (FWD) -0.004 -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008***r-.
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
R.ealoutput (RQ) 0.041 *** 0.032*** 0.057*** 0.038***
t--
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010)
Capital intensity (KL) 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.114***r-.
r- (0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
Skill intensity (SKL) 0.005** 0.011 *** -0.006** 0.002r-.
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
~verage firm size (SIZE) 0.039** 0.045*** 0.094*** 0.064***
t--
(0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015)
Foreign ownership (FOW) 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001 0.0005r-.
r- (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
~xport orientation (EO) 0.000 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.001
I'--
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.0007)
~ndustry concentration (CNC) 0.001 0.001 ** -0.000 0.001
I'-.
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 )
~ade union dummy (DTUN) -0.120** -0.244***
r-, (0.053) (0.064)
l'ime dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
t--.
~aldx2 1.28e+07 561.15 5.84+06 249.64n! 0.553 0.639 0.295 0.410
r-,::0. of observations 850 850 850 850
~. of groups 170 170 170 170
~u-Hausman test l X: (12) = 766.91 X«12)=52.13
Notes: 1. Standard errors adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation are given in brackets,
with statistical significance denoted as *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
2. Null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level.
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Table 7: Panel Unit Root Tests (in levels)
Variables LLC IPS
RWG:TEMP -140.28*** -12.08*"
RWG:TUKW -92.59*** -5.54***
FWD: TEMP -25.40*** -3.03***
FWD:TUKW -25.11 *** -3.07***
RQ -45.24*** -3.01 ***
KL -48.78*** -9.63***
SKL -27.48*** -2.94***
SIZE -30.52*** -3.50***
eNC -199.31 *** -21.73***
FOW -94.84*** -14.49***
£0 -133.34*** -10.62***
Votes: (1) LLC: Test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); IPS: Test developed by Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003).
(2) One lag is used in all cases.
(3) TEMP: total employment; TUKW: total unskilled workers; other notations as defined in Table 5.
*** signify that the variables are stationary in levels.
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dey. Min Max
RWG: TEMP 9.1 0.3 8.1 10.2
RWG: TUKW 8.7 0.3 7.7 9.8
FWD: TEMP 14.0 10.1 0.0 76.2
FWD:TUKW 18.9 13.0 0.0 82.2
RQ 18.5 1.6 13.5 22.9
r--
XL 10.6 0.9 8.5 14.7
r--
SKL 7.4 3.8 0.5 31.3
SIZE 4.2 1.0 0.6 7.2
CNC 31.1 20.5 6.6 97.6
FOW 35.5 22.6 0.0 99.2
EO 29.6 19.0 0.0 92.9
Notes: (1) TEMP: total employment; TUKW: total unskilled workers
(2) Other notations as defined in Table 5.
Table 9: Correlation Matrix
r-,
RWG: RWG: FWD: FWD: RQ KL SKL SIZE CNC FOW
r-, TEMP TUKW TEMP TUKW
RWG: 0.91
!DKw
FWD: -0.41 -0.33
~EMP
FWD: -0.34 -0.30 0.97
lUKW
RQ 0.37 0.33 0.04 0.05
Kz 0.68 0.55 -0.28 -0.22 0.40
Sia_ 0.71 0.55 -0.42 -0.35 0.13 0.59
r-,
SIZE 0.26 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.54 0.23 -0.03
r-,
CNc 0.23 0.23 -0.14 -0.15 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.31
r-,
Pow 0.14 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 -0.03 0.10 0.36 0.48
r-,
£0 -0.19 -0.17 0.22 0.17 0.19 -0.19 -0.17 0.31 0.10 0.57
<,
!votes: (1) TEMP: total employment; TUKW: total unskilled workers
(2) Other notations as defined in Table 5.
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Table 10: Determinates ofInter-Industry Wage Differences: FE-IV and RE-IV Estimates,
1992-20051
(Dependent variable: annual average log of real average annual wage, RWG)
(a) 1992-2005
All Workers Unskilled Workers
FE RE FE RE
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant term 7.995*** 7.531 *** 7.685*** 7.561***
(0.421) (0.278) (0.525) (0.394)
Migrantworker dependence (FWD) 0.003** 0.001 0.000 -0.0003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
R.ealoutput (RQ) 0.003 -0.003 0.0002 -0.003
(0.019) (0.013) (0.024) (0.019)
I'--
Capital intensity (KL) 0.060** 0.109*** 0.048 0.063**
(0.028) (0.021) (0.034) (0.028)
Skill intensity (SKL) 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.033*** 0.034***~
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
AVeragefirm size (SIZE) -0.013 0.001 0.026 0.030
I'--
I'--
(0.020) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023)
~rade union dummy (DTUN) 0.089 -0.051
(0.107) (0.177)
lime dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F'statistics 32.49 18.48
'<,
\\laIdX2 3.76e+06 768.01 2.26e+06 377.26
~ 0.793 0.850 0.661 0.668
<,
No.of observations 322 322 322 322
~o. of groups 23 23 23 23
\\lu-Hausman test' XZ (18)= 24.68 x2 (18)= 0.86
A41
(b) 1992 - 1999
All Workers Unskilled Workers
FE RE FE RE
Regressors
(1) (2) - (3) (4)
Constant term 6.405*** 6.l44*** 6.079*** 5.881 ***
(0.233) (0.l62) (0.299) (0.193)
Migrant worker dependence (FWD) 0.003* -0.0004 -0.001 -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Real output (RQ) 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.068*** 0.063***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011)
Capital intensity (KL) 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.100*** 0.117***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014)
Skill intensity (SKL) 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.013*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003)
Average firm size (SIZE) -0.010 0.008 0.002 0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013)
Trade union dummy (DTUN) -0.014 -0.082
(0.060) (0.068)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistics 119.81 84.61
Waldl 7.10e+06 1231.37 5.2ge+06 1231.80
t--.
R.• 0.649 0.723 0.603 0.651
'<,
No.of observations 960 960 960 960
No.of groups 120 120 120 120
"-
WU-Hausmantest' XZ(12)= 64.00 Xl (12)= 21.98
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(c) 2000 - 2005
I All Workers Unskilled WorkersFE RE FE RE
Regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant term 6.717*** 6.842*** 6.200*** 6.757***
(0.232) (0.165) (0.323) (0.202)
Migrant worker dependence (FWD) -0.004 -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Real output (RQ) 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.057*** 0.037***
t--
(0.010) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010)
Capital intensity (KL) 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.131*** 0.114***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017)
Skill intensity (SKL) 0.005** 0.011*** -0.007** 0.001
.......
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Average firm size (SIZE) 0.039** 0.051 *** 0.094*** 0.070***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.024) (0.015)
Trade union dummy (DTUN) -0.087* -0.234***
.......
(0.052) (0.062)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistics 24.34 11.32
Wald'l 1.28+07 515.79 5.87e+06 230.86
I{< 0.555 0.625 0.300 0.394
No. of observations 850 850 850 850
<,
No. of groups 170 170 170 170
<,
Wu- Hausman test' X2 (9) -785.12 X2 (9) - 45.41
<,
NOles: (1) Standard errors adjusted for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation are given in brackets,
with statistical significance denoted as *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
(2) Null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level.
Figure 1: Share of Manufacturing in GDP and Total Employment (in %)
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Source:Based on data compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia.
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Figure 2: Growth ofGDP and Manufacturing Value-Added (in %)
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Source: Based on data compiled from Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Bank Negara Malaysia.
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Figure 3: Foreign Workers in Malaysian Manufacturing, 1985-2005
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r-FW -+-FWD:TEMPI
Legend:
FW: Total number offoreign workers (left scale)
FWD: TEMP: Share offoreign workers in total employment, % (right scale)
Source: Compiled from unpublished returns to the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries conducted by the
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
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Figure 4: Share of Foreign Workers (%) and Real Annual Average Wages (in log)
in Malaysian Manufacturing, 1985-2005
(a) All Workers
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Legend:
FWD: TEMP: Share of foreign workers in total employment, % (left scale)
FWD: TUKW: Share of unskilled foreign workers in total unskilled production workers, % (left scale)
RWG: TEMP: Logarithmic of Real annual average wages of total employees (right scale)
RWG: TUKW: Logarithmic of Real annual average wages of unskilled production workers (right scale)
Source: Compiled from unpublished returns to the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries conducted by the
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
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Figure 5: Share of Foreign Workers in Total Employment (%) and Real Annual
Average Wages (in log) in MSIC 5-digit Industries, 2000-2005
(a) All Workers
I{)
o...
0
e-
~
I{)
OS
~ OJ
I{)
a:I
CXl
0 20 40FWD: TEMP
60
.. - - - .
(b) Unskilled Workers
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Legend:
FWD: TEMP: Share of foreign workers in total employment, % (left scale)
FWD: TUKW Share of unskilled foreign workers in total unskilled production workers, % (left scale)
RWG: TEMP: Logarithmic of Real annual average wages of total employees (right scale)
RWG: TUKW: Logarithmic of Real annual average wages of unskilled production workers (right scale)
Source: Compiled from unpublished returns to the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Industries conducted by the
Department of Statistics, Malaysia.
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